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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the concepts of fragility, robustness, anti-fragility,
reification, world risk society, modernity, informal international lawmak-
ing, and their relationship to international law in the field of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P). We shall begin with articulations and definitions of
the terms involved.
Fragile systems break down in the event of a crisis. They do not sur-
vive. They are vulnerable to large-scale, unpredictable events. Fragility is
the accelerating sensitivity to a "harmful stressor." Robust systems have
the power to resist hazards, but they too are breakable at a certain point
and do not guarantee complete security against risks.3 They are merely less
fragile. Robust systems are densely regulated systems and reflect the mod-
ernist view that top-down regulation can avert harmful stressors. Further,
robust systems cannot take advantage of volatility. Randomness is not an
opportunity but a danger to be absolutely avoided. Robust systems use
"probability models" and "insurance mechanisms" to avoid randomness.
However, these models and mechanisms themselves create other uncer-
tainties. By contrast, an anti-fragile system does not break down. It may
suffer damage, but in the end it takes advantage of crises and difficulties.
Anti-fragility thus gains from disorder.4 Risks, volatility, randomness, and
uncertainty are therefore advantages for the anti-fragile system, whereby it
renovates itself through the information to which it is exposed. An anti-
fragile system absorbs harmful stressors and utilizes them as opportunities
* Istanbul Sehir University, Law Faculty, Istanbul, Turkey, Assistant Professor (International
Law). Special thanks to Rakesh Jobanputra for his comments on this article.
1. NASSINI NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE 11-12, 17 (Random House 2012).
2. Id. at 23-27.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 20.
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for self-improvement. Anti-fragility is the non-linear response to harmful
stressors and leads to more benefit than harm, thus allowing and ensuring
survival.' All surviving complex systems are anti-fragile.
Reification means the freezing of parameters of an ideology, whereby
a certain reality is established as immutable. The world order reifies in a
linguistic worldview and cannot be seen as an interpretive system open to
criticism.' Reification is the corollary of modernity. By contrast, a world
risk society predicates uncertainty, unawareness, and a lack of knowledge.
It requires modesty on the part of policy makers-risks cannot be elimi-
nated. Whereas the modernist legalist approach believes in the power of
central organization and positive law for eliminating risk, the world risk
society approach does not favor top-down and formalist legal regulations
of international relations. It argues that the success of modernity is now
producing consequences for which we do not have any answers. Hence, the
notion of the world risk society understanding is compatible with anti-frag-
ile thinking. Modernity, in terms of international law, denotes a reliance
on the nation-state, respect for sovereignty, a favoring of centralization,
and the belief in the normative value of written rules. These characteristics
of modernity pose a conundrum for the supporters of humanitarian inter-
vention-and for the R2P.
Informal international lawmaking denotes law outside the formalist
strictures of traditional international lawmaking. That is to say, there is
neither an international treaty, nor are there binding legal obligations or
mechanisms for delegating authority to other bodies for the purpose of le-
gal interpretation. Mere guidelines, concepts, standards, and benchmarks
are posited, with the latter accepted as international law if actually imple-
mented and complied with by participants.' In other words, informal inter-
national lawmaking favors effects over the form. It rejects classical sources
of international law-as indicated in Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ)'-and instead favors a new method of law-
making."o It is a challenge to the modern understanding of international
5. Id. at 7.
6. JETRGEN HABERNIAS, THE THEORY OF CONINILTNICATIVE ACTION, VOLLTNIE 1: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 69 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984).
7. ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY 72-75 (Polity Press 1999).
8. INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Ayelet Berman et al. eds., Torkel Opsahl Aca-
demic EPublisher 2012). .
9. Article 38 provides in pertinent part:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 1.
10. JORG KANINIERHOFER, UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 199 (Routledge 2011) (defin-
ing sources of law as methods of law creation).
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law and, due to its acknowledgement of uncertainty, is compatible with the
concept of the world risk society.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the term proposed by a Commis-
sion convened by Canada in 2001. It received approval to counter humani-
tarian crises the world over in the United Nation's (UN) 2005 World
Summit Outcome and the Security Council (SC) 1' and General Assembly
(GA) resolutions. In the event of neglect or failure of the nation-state in
preventing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleans-
ing within its own borders, the international community is given the re-
sponsibility by the R2P to warn the state and, if deemed necessary,
militarily intervene. The R2P represents the third type of intervention in
the domestic affairs of weak states-"failed states" in contemporary par-
lance-after World War II. The first two were developmentalism and ne-
oliberalism. The R2P is not, however, ratified by an international treaty
and whether it has become a customary rule of international law or a gen-
eral principle of law remains open to debate.
11. The Resolution outlines the R2P:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the preven-
tion of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support
the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). The
Resolution also outlines the methods of accomplishing the R2P:
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chap-
ters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collec-
tive action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national au-
thorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to con-
tinue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the princi-
ples of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary
and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are
under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
Id. at 139.
12. The R2P principle has been referred to by the SC for the protection of civilians in intra-state
armed conflicts. See S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1814 (May 15, 2008); S.C. Res. 1973,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). On top of that, the SC has implicitly or explicitly approved
some unilateral humanitarian interventions after they took place. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
788 (Nov. 19, 1992): S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
13. On September 14, 2009, the General Assembly passed its first resolution on the R2P and a
General Assembly debate in July 2011 reasserted its support for the R2P concept. The Responsibility
to Protect, G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7 2009); Press Release, General Assembly,
'For Those Facing Mass Rape and Violence, the Slow Pace of Global Deliberations Offers No Relief,'
Secretary-General Cautions in General Assembly Debate, GA/11112 (July 12, 2011).
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At present, the R2P seems to be a concept rather than a legal rule.
The R2P is a new initiative aiming to resolve the dilemma between inter-
vention in state activities-which is currently forbidden in international law
under Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN Charter-and the protection of
human rights. The R2P favors the "responsibility" of the international
community over the "right" to humanitarian intervention and it stresses a
more comprehensive approach, in comparison to humanitarian interven-
tion. It includes three stages-prevention, intervention, and rebuilding.
This article does not explain the history of the R2P, nor does it at-
tempt to formulate a comprehensive policy analysis through an examina-
tion of the attitudes of the international community with regard to past
humanitarian crises. The R2P raises a whole series of highly complex inter-
national legal issues, many of which remain outside the scope of this paper.
Instead of tackling each of these issues, this paper instead focuses on a
rather limited question-that is, the conceptualization of the R2P, and dis-
cusses the difficulties encountered in understanding and regulating the
R2P. Actually, with the recent humanitarian crisis in Libya and the ongo-
ing turmoil in Syria, these difficulties have become all the more acute. The
questions with regard to the R2P raised by these crises have, it can be said,
baffled the international community.
This paper presents a normative argument: the international commu-
nity should endorse an anti-fragile understanding of the R2P-a system
that copes with the volatility inherent in the R2P. Humanitarian crises and
interventions in sovereign states for the sake of the protection of perse-
cuted populations are large-scale and unpredictable events-"harmful
stressors" challenging UN law. The R2P should be envisaged in an anti-
fragile way, so that international law does not break down as a conse-
quence of such events. In effect, qualifying the use of force under interna-
tional law is no easy task. It is better to speak of possibilities of
legitimization, mitigating circumstances, tendencies, and more or less justi-
fiable practices, instead of employing black and white terms such as lawful
or unlawful"-and this is also a way to better interpret and understand the
R2P.
In this context, it cannot be denied that the R2P does not belong in the
realm of positive international law. This is possible by perceiving the ef-
forts for the establishment of the R2P as an example of informal interna-
tional lawmaking. Instead of a pseudo-stability created on paper through
"positivization"-which ignores the harmful stressors of international
politics-the inefficiencies in the functioning of the R2P should be ac-
knowledged. That is to say, an approach based on a world risk society-
which doubts the ability of legal regulation of the R2P to remedy global
humanitarian crises-should prevail. Moreover, inefficiencies in the opera-
tion of the R2P should be seen as an integral part of the R2P, not as
obstacles.




Rather than accumulating tensions under the polish of positive inter-
national law-which did not avert grave crises like the First and Second
World Wars or the current crop of humanitarian crises ongoing in places
such as Syria and Burma-the international system should be flexible
enough to let the practicalities lead the path ahead of legalese. In launch-
ing the concept of the R2P, the international community made a commend-
able effort. In this regard, the international community should not be
demoralized by the fact that the R2P has not entered into the realm of
positive international law. In fact, this can be seen as an advantage. The
affirmation of the R2P by the UN's World Summit Outcome in 2005 is the
acknowledgement by the international community that there is no sharp
distinction between politics, ethics, and international law. Although the
Summit Outcome is not binding, it does represent the power of ethics. It
may not legalize war on a new autonomous legal basis, but it still legiti-
mizes it. The GA and SC resolutions mentioning the R2P did not legalize
the R2P either, but again they did legitimize it. Hence the R2P constitutes
a challenge to a positive international law supposedly constituted merely
by rules.15 The R2P is a play on the modernity of the post-1945 era.
This paper does not argue for dissolution of international law within
the framework of international politics. International law may continue to
pursue its normative ambitions with regard to the R2P. This is all very
well. However, modesty and a caveat are in order. The gap between the
sovereignty paradigm in the UN Charter and its practical challenges is con-
siderable. The reconciliation of international law, embodied by the UN
Charter, with the politics of international intervention is not easy. Being
useful as a concept, the R2P may not be practical if further legalization is
pursued. International law should therefore continue to observe develop-
ments with regard to the R2P. The R2P may, in the future, be favorable to
positivization. However, for now, this requires an honest acknowledge-
ment by the international legal scholarship that the path towards further
legalization of the R2P would lead to international law becoming more
fragile and would lead to greater harm than benefit.
This paper first discusses UN law in the field of intervention, after
which, the approach to the R2P is delineated, followed by an examination
of the relationship between sovereignty and human rights. The concepts of
violence and ideology are then considered under different sections. The
paper concludes by highlighting the need for the anti-fragility of the R2P.
II. UNITED NATIONs LAW
Standing up to the randomness and uncertainty of international polit-
ics is a challenge for the UN. This challenge becomes all the more visible
15. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAw 83-98 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (arguing that inter-
national law is more than mere rules).
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when it comes to the issue of intervention. The International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ), in the Corfu Channel ruling, openly admitted this when it deter-
mined that it could "only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever the present defects in interna-
tional organization, find a place in international law.""
The Court admits to the defects of the post-1945 international system.
Still, it does not endorse any exception whatsoever to the prohibition of the
use of force apart from two explicitly endorsed exceptions in the UN Char-
ter-Security Council enforcement under Article 42 and self-defense under
Article 51. Thus, the UK's argument in the Corfu Channel case1 7 that the
British use of force in the Corfu Channel did not involve any threat to the
territorial integrity or political independence of Albania-and thus did not
literally violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter-did not affect the Court.
The Court did not endorse such a circumvention of Article 2(4) by the UK.
The UK's objective, so the UK argued, was the securing of free navigation
of international straits and waters. Nevertheless, the Court did not attempt
to counter the free navigation of international waters with the prohibition
of use of force.
Likewise, in the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States ruling, the ICJ, in
clear terms, favored the principle of non-intervention, whatever the politi-
cal regime of the intervened upon country. The Court made it clear that it
viewed intervention in another state with a view to changing its ideology or
political system as illegitimate." The USA thus could not rely on the argu-
ment of "bringing democracy and human rights" to justify intervention in
Nicaragua. The ICJ stated that: "[w]hile the US might form its own ap-
praisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use
of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such
respect." 9
The same is true of humanitarian intervention as well. The interven-
tion in Kosovo in 1999 and its aftermath is a case in point. The United
States,20 the UK, 2 and Belgium99 were clear as to the humanitarian dimen-
sion of the intervention in Kosovo. But, Belgium was the only NATO
16. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Decision, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 263 (June 27).
19. Id. at 268.
20. Jim Garamone, Clinton Makes Case for Kosovo Intervention, ARMED FORCES PRESS SER-
VICE, Mar. 24, 1999, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspxid=42001.
21. The United Kingdom argued in the SC that "in the current circumstances military interven-
tion was justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe."
Natalino Ronzitti, Lessons of International Law from NATO's Armed Intervention Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, XXXIV(3) THE INT'L SPECTATOR 45, 47 (1999).
22. Belgium argued that both the cumulative effect of the SC resolutions pointing to the situa-
tion in Kosovo and the armed humanitarian intervention were two legitimate grounds on which to
argue for the legal right of NATO to intervene. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Verbatim
Record, CR 99/15, 3-4, 11-12 (May 10, 1999 3 p.m.), www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4513.pdf.
[VOL. 32:467472
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country that dared argue before the ICJ that alleged humanitarian inter-
vention-Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia-was compatible with Ar-
ticle 2(4), for it did not violate the territorial integrity or the political
independence of Yugoslavia.2 Although this case was not decided on pro-
cedural grounds, Belgium's isolated position demonstrated the difficulty of
making a legal case for humanitarian intervention. Indeed, most NATO
members presented the intervention in Kosovo as an "exceptional inter-
vention" under "exceptional circumstances."
A broad consensus seems to exist that accepts that intervention is re-
strained on the level of positive international law, whatever the political
and humanitarian motivations. The reasons advanced by interveners-
freedom of the seas, the establishment of human rights and democracy, and
humanitarian concerns-are significant values. Nevertheless, those values
must unquestionably yield to the principle that prohibits the use of force.
In the realm of positive international law, there is no mechanism to balance
those values with the prohibition of intervention. The understanding of
UN law is that state sovereignty and internationalism complement each
other and no pretext shall breach this complementarity apart from the two
explicit exceptions indicated in the Charter.
The lack of protection of aforementioned values is a result of the post-
1945 modernity. Modernity is the "stifling of volatility and stressors" and
"corresponds to the systematic extraction of humans from their arbitrary
physical, social and epistemological ecologies."' Hence the UN Charter
embodies the epistemological modernization of the use of force. It com-
prises a legalese attempt at the overstabilization of the use of force with the
acknowledgement of only two exceptions.
In this, UN law creates the impression that it is a matter of fact but not
of choice. It assumes the entirety of responsibility for violence on the inter-
national stage. This is the modern understanding of international law,
which asserts that all the relevant considerations are held into account by
"comprehensive" UN law. 5 But, the "modern" UN Charter as an "insur-
ance mechanism"-a "probability model"-itself created the problem of
the non-protection of aforementioned values.
It is interesting to note that during the twentieth century, 35 million
people died in all international wars, while 150 million people were killed
by their own governments.2 There is no indication yet in the twenty-first
century that civil wars around the world will end in the foreseeable future,
yet, civil war is not mentioned in the UN Charter. The Charter avoids any
reference to domestic crises within States, focusing solely, instead on inter-
national war, using the language of a definite remedy to the scourge of war.
The UN represents a modernist initiative on the part of the international
23. Id. at 12.
24. TALEB, supra note 1, at 108.
25. KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 77-83.
26. CATHERINE LT, JUTST AND UNJTST INTERVENTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 53-54 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2006).
2014] 473
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community of sovereign States to restrict the reality of war to its interna-
tional dimensions whilst neglecting civil wars and intra-state conflict. If
modernity is to be envisaged as the reduction of reality to clear and defini-
tive black-and-white dichotomies, the UN Charter, with its ostensibly de-
finitive dichotomy between the internal and external affairs of nation-
states, is the epitome of this reductionism.
The counter is that civil laws are not completely excluded from inter-
national law-the Charter cannot be the sole criterion. General interna-
tional law shows a concern for intra-state conflicts and likens it to inter-
state conflicts. The prime example is the Geneva Conventions-Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II thereto-that regulate conduct during
civil law. International humanitarian law regulates both international and
domestic conflicts. The Nicaragua ruling of the International Court of Jus-
tice endorses the applicability of the Geneva Convention's provisions to
both international and internal armed conflicts and further bolsters the
view that the line between internal and international affairs is a fine one.
Indeed, the Tadic ruling of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia stated that the definition of "armed conflict" encapsulates
both inter-state and intra-state conflicts: "an armed conflict exists when-
ever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.
Likewise, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, in 1995, stated that "the settled practice of the
Security Council and the common understanding of the United Nations
membership in general" is that even a purely internal armed conflict may
constitute a "threat to the peace.""
Thus, it is not surprising that UN peacekeeping forces are dispatched
not only in the event of wars between countries, but also to civil war zones
within state borders as well. Most importantly, in UN practice, civil wars
may also be interpreted as a danger to international peace and security.
This was the case with, for example, civil wars in Somalia"o, Iraq,"1 the Su-
dan," Libya, and Southern Rhodesia," all of which were internationalized
by the Security Council (SC). Likewise, the protection of civilians and the
objective of halting violations of civil liberties and human rights, and the
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
218-19. Rules in common Article 3 reflected "elementary considerations of humanity," and the
Rules "applicable in international and internal armed conflicts are identical." Id.
28. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Ap-
peal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
29. Id. at 30.
30. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
31. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
32. S.C. Res. 1706, supra note 12, at 3 ("Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security.").
33. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966) (declaring that the continued existence
of Southern Rhodesia's racist minority Smith regime-a wholly domestic issue-constituted a threat to
international peace and security).
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need to resort to force under Chapter VII of the Charter, have been af-
firmed by Security Council resolutions on Rwanda," Burundij and
Haiti. 6
In particular, though SC Resolution 940 (1994) on Haiti referred to the
flow of refugees across the boundaries between Haiti and its neighbors as
an argument to internationalize the issue, it found in the systematic viola-
tions of human rights committed and the overthrow of the democratically
elected government an element of international concern. It is all the more
interesting that SC Resolution 933 did not even mention the trans-border
effects of the Haiti crisis; the restoration of the democratic government was
seen by the SC as sufficient cause for action.37 Such a flexible interpreta-
tion of the powers of Chapter VII points to a hopefully more permissive
attitude to the R2P. However, the UN cannot be accused of dereliction of
duty when the humanitarian crisis remains wholly within the borders of a
State. Indeed, the SC may refrain from internationalizing an intra-State
conflict, as was seen in the 2011 Shia-Sunni conflict in Bahrain, 3  and can-
not be held accountable for that.
Furthermore, even in those cases where the SC internationalizes civil
wars, the unique and exceptional circumstances of the interventions in the
seemingly internal affairs have been underlined by SC resolutions. Ex-
traordinary circumstances are implied for the legitimization of these inter-
ventions;3 9 SC Resolution 794 underscored the unique character of the
Somalia situation and the need for exceptional response. Although a good
34. S.C. Res. 925, U.N. Doc. S/RES/925 (June 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929
(June 22, 1994).
35. S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004).
36. S.C. Res. 933, U.N. Doc. S/RES/933 (June 30, 1994); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(July 31, 1994).
37. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the
Use of Force, 59 INT'L ORG 527, 531 (2005); Christopher J. Le Mon & Rachel S. Taylor, Security Coun-
cil Action in the Name of Human Rights, 11 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 292 (2003).
38. The repression of the Shia population by the Sunnite government in Bahrain passed unno-
ticed even though these two intra-State conflicts took place at the same time in the same geography.
Jayshree Bajoria, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, COTNCIL ON FOREIGN REL, March 24, 2011,
available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480. Moreover:
Marjorie Cohn, a law professor at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, argues the Obama
administration is silent on Yemen and Bahrain (Huffington Post) because they are close U.S.
allies. The White House has condemned the violence in those two countries too, urging their
governments to show restraint, but any stronger action has yet to be taken. Others note more
pressing cases for humanitarian intervention from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the
Ivory Coast-to question Libya as the R2P test case.
Id. Similarly, in 1946, the SC did not describe Franco's Spain as a threat under Chapter VII of the
Charter notwithstanding the immense atrocities committed at the time. AIDAN HEHIR, HLTNIANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION AFTER Kosovo 19 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
39. Apart from the SC, the international community refers to the sui generis character of these
interventions as well. Simon Chesterman, 'Leading from Behind'. The Responsibility to Protect, the
Obana Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 15 (N.Y. Univ. School of Law, Working
Paper No. 11-35, 2011). For instance, in relation to Kosovo, the German, American, and the British
governments underlined the exceptional character of the interventions. Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo
Intervention. Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 ELTR. J. INT'L L. 597, 609 (2002).
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example of the intervention in the internal affairs of a State,40 SC Resolu-
tion 940 (1994) on Haiti also highlighted the "unique character of the situa-
tion." Likewise, SC Resolution 929 on Rwanda (1994) argued that the
Council faced a unique case.
In fact, the expression "unique and exceptional" is the signal that the
modern-reductionist UN Charter is unable to deal with civil wars. The pro-
hibition of the use of force-with only two exceptions-and the use of
terms such as "unique and exceptional" in SC resolutions illustrates the
dilemma of the modernist framework. This difference between the written
rules of the Charter and the practice of the SC to invoke "unique and ex-
ceptional circumstances" for intervention in civil wars is a source of ambi-
guity-an organizational ambiguity.
Organizational ambiguity is neither a defect nor a deviation. It is in-
herent in most international organizations. The vagaries and randomness
of international politics render international organizations ambiguous. In
the face of the uncertainty of international politics, organizational goals are
often unclear, contradictory, or otherwise poorly specified." This is the
case with the UN Charter, which underlines both human rights4 2 and sover-
eignty." In the event of humanitarian crises-the "harmful stressors" chal-
lenging the UN law-the two concepts unsurprisingly clash. The issue at
hand is the extent of this clash and how it is to be managed and resolved.
There is still no procedure or criterion to deal with the clash between
the two. Two conflicting principles exist side by side, and this creates an
inherent ambiguity. A case in point is Security Council Resolution 1244 on
Kosovo."4 The resolution created an ambiguity by formally recognizing
Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo while simultaneously instructing the UN
Mission in Kosovo to establish the institutions of substantial autonomy and
self-government in the province. Yugoslav sovereignty co-existed as
though there were no contradictions alongside the extreme autonomy
granted to a province of Yugoslavia, Kosovo, after a military intervention
for the sake of the protection of the Kosovar Albanians.
Modernists would be disturbed by this ambiguity. In ideal speech situ-
ations inspired by modernity, everything should be on the table, without
any contradictory objectives existent. However, in most political conflicts,
40. See Le Mon & Taylor, supra note 37, at 263.
41. FRANCIS FLTKLTYAIIA, STATE-BLTILDING GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 51 (Cornell Univ. Press 2004).
42. Article 55 of the UN Charter provides in pertinent part:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. Charter art. 55, para. (c).
43. Article 2 of the UN Charter provides that -[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members." Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
44. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
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much goes unsaid. Intervention in a sovereign state is a political argu-
ment-and much about intervention goes unsaid. The practice of interven-
tion-the "life-world" or the "essence" of international politics-is
different from that of the modern systemic-world of the UN Charter."5
The concept of "overcompensation" could throw further light on the
"modern" UN Charter and the uncertainties it causes. Overcompensation
takes place when an unforeseen challenge emerges and endangers the pre-
established parameters." The challenge leads the system to transform
more than it would take place under ordinary conditions or in reaction to
minor difficulties. If the system is fragile, it breaks down. If it is robust
enough, it resists further. Yet, in the event of higher tension, it is ultimately
breakable. However, if the system is "anti-fragile," it reacts by reforming
and improving itself-the overcompensation mode. The challenge im-
proves the system more than expected.
Before the First and Second World Wars, some serious initiatives
against war were taken-the Hague Conventions of 189917 and 1907," the
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact.' 9 These measures "modernized" and "robustified" the international
system against intervention. However, they were not enough to prevent
the two world wars. International politics were twice broken. Lessons
were drawn and the post-1945 system-with its "never again" motto-
stands as a clear case of overcompensation.
In this regard, the UN did not mature gradually.o On the contrary,
sponsored by the Great Powers, its birth was abrupt, and its midwife was
war.5 1 It tried to completely and universally eliminate the use of force pro-
viding only two exceptions to this blanket provision. The risk of total nu-
clear war is also worth taking into account as a significant factor in this
absolute aversion to armed conflict. The system became more robust by
being universally and formally endorsed by all States5' and by establishing
an ostensible consensus.5 ' This is the epitome of building extra capacity
and strength-overcompensation-in anticipation of a global conflict and
is the reaction to information about such a grave possibility.54  Interna-
tional politics proved itself anti-fragile by reconstructing itself on the ashes
of World War II. Yet, the reconstruction again acquired a modern shape.
45. J LRGEN HABERNIAS, THE THEORY OF CONINI LI NICATIVE ACTION, VOLL ENI 2: LIFEWORD AND
SYSTEM 117 (Beacon Press 1987).
46. Taleb, supra note 1, at 41-48.
47. See Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187
Consol. T.S. 410.
48. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
22777, 205 Consol T.S. 277.
49. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
50. MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD, at XV (Penguin Books 2012).
51. Id.
52. The 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact was not universally ratified.
53. The United Nations is more inclusive in comparison with the League of Nations.
54. TALEB, supra note 1, at 45.
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That is, an international political system of an anti-fragile nature con-
structed under the banner of the UN Charter, a modern international law
regarding the use of force.
By approving only two exceptions to the use of force, the post-1945
international system brought about an ostensible clarity. The system be-
came robust to future shocks that could be of the magnitude of the Second
World War. This is the modernist approach: Seemingly clear-cut rules and
exceptions, reliance on the power of the written rule addressed to the na-
tion-state, belief in the power of a central and universal organization
formed by these nation-states, trust in the power of positive international
law to eliminate risks, and the belief in the "robustification" of the system.
The problem inherent to modernity is that, in the long term, tensions
accumulate behind the scenes and become costly in terms of lives. Moder-
nity, under the cover of stability, contains the seeds of its own undoing.
The great complacency that led to the First World War after almost a cen-
tury of relative peace in Europe in the nineteenth century is a case in point,
alongside the rise of the heavily armed nation-state. The 1815 Vienna
Congress System was thought to have established peace in Europe. How-
ever, the robustness constructed by the 1815 system was inadequate in the
volatile and random arena of European politics. Although it prevented a
number of wars until the First World War, the latter was the unexpected
result of accumulated tensions.
Likewise, in the post-1945 period, the phenomenon of war continued
the world over. Just mentioning several of the conflicts with accompanying
and grave humanitarian crises is enough to make the point: Kosovo,
Rwanda, Syria, Somali, Sudan, Congo, Colombia, Iraq, Sierra Leone, East
Timor, Afghanistan, and Burma. The humanitarian crises are evidence that
the UN's modernist-robust-approach cannot cope with the realities on
the ground. The two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force pro-
vided in the UN Charter have not helped prevent these endemic human
tragedies. Beneath the veneer of the UN Charter, violence in a multitude
of states has emerged incessantly and without remedy, although thankfully
a Third World War has so far been averted.
The size of international politics is a factor, too. The "modern" fragil-
ity of the post-Second World War system arises from the size of the chal-
lenge. The 1815 Vienna Congress System regulated only European politics,
but the UN system's scope is the whole world. The international system is
complex and vulnerable to acute errors. Causality is not easy to come by.
There are a lot of interactions. Non-linearity is the order of the day. This
is the world-risk society.
Modern international law, as represented by the UN Charter, purports
to bring an order to international politics. Yet, the danger is that where
one seeks order, a pseudo-order is created.5 ' That is the case especially
55. Id. at 105.
56. Id. at 6-7.
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with regard to use of force and intervention, where uncertainty is notori-
ously multi-phenomenal and multi-causal. The R2P should be approached
and developed by taking into account all these factors. The value protected
by the R2P-the protection of civilian populations in humanitarian crises-
is a challenge to this modernity. The R2P "communicates" that the "mod-
ern" UN Charter is in fact a matter of choice and that the international
community cannot leave all responsibility for humanitarian crises to the
UN Charter.
III. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Increasing justification of the use of force does not mean that it will be
more effective. Modern regulation of the R2P may give us a merely formal
and ostensible security. However, this would not do away with the risks
and randomness inherent in the politics of humanitarian crises. Instead, it
would expose and make more fragile international law. Indeed, it is debat-
able as to whether international law has ever been responsible for inaction.
More commonly, inaction has been a function of the triumph of the lack of
will.5 7
Regarding the anti-fragile approach, civil wars and interventions func-
tion as information." Volatility could be a component of the overall stabil-
ity of the international system. In other words, rather than seeing the R2P
as a modernization project building upon the modern UN Charter and try-
ing to establish it as a rule of positive international law, the R2P should be
a function of anti-fragile lawmaking. Rather than a codification attempt,
the R2P is to be regarded as a discourse attempt. Rather than formal law,
it should be framed by the precepts of informal international lawmaking.
The R2P should not be seen as a modern and new legal construct,
completely different from humanitarian intervention, but as a return to
past humanitarian interventions, and with a flexible outlook. It may well
be argued that it is thus merely a reiteration of "humanitarian interven-
tion" with a new label. Still, it may be countered that an attempted return
to the past will produce something new.' 9 Any iteration necessarily brings
a novelty. No return to the past repeats the past absolutely. This return to
the past merely indicates that the past "culture" of humanitarian interven-
tion is linked with the "new" concept of the R2P, but with a change from a
modern to an anti-fragile mode.
In this respect, the 2005 World Summit-high plenary meeting of the
General Assembly, which solemnly declared the R2P-should be seen as
the incarnation of anti-fragile and informal international lawmaking. The
World Summit Outcome's conclusions on the R2P-paragraphs 138 and
139-did not create binding obligations nor did it delegate authority to
other bodies for the purpose of legal interpretation. It merely proposed
57. AIDAN HEHIR, HUTMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 103 (Palgrave Macmillan 2010).
58. TALEB, supra note 1, at 106.
59. PETER BUTRKE, WHAT IS CLTULt RAL HISTORY? 104 (Polity 2d ed. 2008).
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guidelines for future SC action. True, the World Summit is more than an
ordinary General Assembly meeting and is representative of world opinion
on a global scale. It represents the attitude of the international community
to specific questions and can give impetus to developments in international
law. It can even be considered proof of the opinio juris of the international
community as regards the R2P. Still, it is difficult to argue for the custom-
ary rule status of the R2P because of the irregular practice of intervention.
Hence, the World Summit did not establish a new norm of R2P; it merely
made the SC more anti-fragile to future humanitarian crises. From the
World Summit onwards, the SC does not have to invoke the "unique and
exceptional" nature of interventions to prevent humanitarian crises. A
new argument, the R2P, could replace "unique and exceptional" terminol-
ogy-the "modern" terminology.
The question is, ultimately do we have to situate the R2P within the
current framework of positive international law? That is to say, should the
international community be looking, ultimately, for an international treaty,
a customary rule, a general principle of law-those indicated in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice? Should informal law
making strategies-the absence of an international treaty, the favoring of
effects over form, attributing the decisive role to implementation, a lack of
binding rules, and importance given to concepts-be just a temporary tac-
tic? Or should our view of international law in the face of current crises,
with regard to humanitarian issues, be revised altogether?
The R2P does not ultimately have to be anchored in either an interna-
tional treaty or customary international law. Indeed, in a legal order such
as the international order of today, one that is in many ways still in an
infancy of sorts and which attributes so much importance to names, terms
and labels; concepts surely also matter.o That is because of the confusion
of languages, cultures, legal structures, and the extreme volatility of the
politics of humanitarian crises. One might argue that the international
community, with regard to the R2P, does not need a formal hierarchy of
norms or a common rule of recognition in the Kelsenian and Hartian
sense." In this approach, international law consists of a set of rules and
concepts without the existence of a basic rule or rules of recognition pro-
viding unity to rules and making it a system.1 And the R2P should be seen
as one of those concepts-its effects being dependent on the political con-
text and the actors involved.
However, there may be two objections. First, in the long term, sub-
stance has to develop alongside the nominal claim; otherwise the accept-
ance of the term itself is eroded." And the development of substance may
60. Peter Hilpold, From Humanitarian Intervention to Respoinsbility to Protect. Making Utopia
True?, in FROMi BILATERALISNI TO CONINILINITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOTR OF JUTDGE BRTNO
SININIA 462, 470 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
61. Dirk Pulkowski, Universal International Law's Grammar, in FROMi BILATERALISNI TO COM-
MTNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOTR OF JUTDGE BRTNO SININIA 138, 139 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2011).
62. KANINIERHOFER, supra note 10, at 227.
63. Hilpold, supra note 60, at 470.
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take place primarily through examples. The ambiguity inherent in the im-
plementation of the R2P can be dealt with through consistent practice.
Whatever our view of the nature of international law, the R2P is to be
progressively delineated in its test cases and concretized. Effects of the
R2P and compliance with it are to be evaluated and theorized. For in-
stance, will the SC employ the term "R2P" in other humanitarian crises in
the future-like in SC Resolution 1973 on Libya-and thus strengthen the
R2P? Will regional actors have more say in implementing the R2P? Will a
certain pattern of R2P interventions establish itself?
Second, a formal legal benchmark could be chosen to give a direction
to the development of the R2P. A formal source of international law-one
of those indicated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice-could be targeted for streamlining the efforts towards delineating
the contours and determining the influence of the R2P. Mere practice of
the R2P and policy might not sufficiently develop its substance. The out-
right insistence on a modernist-positivist approach to the R2P would im-
pair or perhaps nullify the concept, but this does not mean that the R2P
won't have any perspective on positive international law. In this connec-
tion, the R2P can be conceptualized as a future general principle of law. In
fact, in comparison with treaty and custom, general principles of law are
the most flexible source of international law. The R2P, while remaining
informal and not creating any binding obligations, could be envisaged as a
future principle filling in the gaps of treaty law and customary law. This
would respond to the delicate balance that needs to be struck between sov-
ereignty and human rights.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
There are many international human rights treaties" through which a
certain "international discourse" of human rights has established itself after
World War 11. The "international discourse" of human rights violations has
become legitimate," with no country exempt. Yet, with the modernist ap-
proach, human rights are finally a private matter between the sovereign
state and its citizens. The international community must not forcefully in-
tervene in the nation-state for the sake of human rights. No international
human rights treaty can stipulate use of force for the application of human
rights norms. Human rights provisions apply only to the extent to which
the sovereign State permits them-the discretion of the state has the upper
hand. The sovereign state is the sole authority over its territory; it is juridi-
cally equal to other states; and the state is not subject to any law to which it
did not or does not consent.
64. See Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3: Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
65. "The spread of popular novels-and the 18th century was effectively the birthplace of the
novel in the Western world-gave readers new opportunities to think about other people's pain and
suffering (whether physical and emotional), which could lead to new interests at the human rights
level." PETER N. STEARNS, HTMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD HISTORY 67 (Routledge 2012).
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International human rights law leaves a considerable margin of appre-
ciation to states. In other words, compliance with human rights norms is
still seen as a component of domestic political regimes. Human rights talk
cannot go so far as to impose a holistic view on states-that is, no liberal
political regime could be imposed on violator countries. There is neither
an international treaty nor a customary norm for a national political re-
gime. There is no democratic standard of sovereignty-no democratic
norm thesis-in international law.6" National sovereignty is a question of
fact, not democracy. There is no "universal" human rights treaty requiring
the existence of liberal democratic regimes to secure human rights.
Regime inviolability is strongly anchored in international law. The
UN Charter's focus is international peace and security, not domestic re-
gimes. The Charter does not make an explicit link between international
peace and security and domestic regimes of countries. There is no require-
ment for States to be liberal democracies in order to be members of the
UN. Those undemocratic national regimes that do not respect the human
rights of their citizens maintain their seats at the UN. Representatives of
non-liberal regimes possess diplomatic status. The legal authority of non-
liberal countries is not questioned in the international arena; thus, the acts
of those countries do not lack validity. For instance, the law of treaties-
i.e., the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-does not state that
undemocratic or illiberal countries cannot assume binding obligations.
Nevertheless, as mentioned early on, "exceptional" UN interventions
in the domestic affairs of countries in the name of human rights have oc-
curred; the assertive attitude of the SC towards South Africa until the end
of apartheid, the racist white minority regime of Southern Rhodesia and
Haiti after the overthrow of its democratically elected government being
prominent examples in this respect. Furthermore, there are examples of
interference in domestic political regimes through regional human rights
arrangements: the European and American human rights convention sys-
tems.17 The Inter-American Court is not seen merely as an instance for
human rights adjudication, but also as a political regime setter." It has an
intruding agenda due to the past of the Latin and Central American coun-
tries." It aims at the prevention of return to dictatorial regimes and takes
into account the political context of the region.o On the other hand, the
European Convention on Human Rights explicitly makes references to the
link between democracy and human rights.7 ' The European Court of
66. StTSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONs 48-49 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
67. ININIANETEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTENIS ANALYSIs ? (Duke Univ. Press 2004).
68. Ludovic Hennebel, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Ambassador of Univer-
salism, 2011 OLTEBEC J.INT'L L.57, 97, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962558.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
arts. 8(2), 9(2), & 10(2), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5.
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Human Rights strengthened the link between the two.7n Democracy has
become an identity element of the "European Public Order."
Thus, international protection of human rights can, in exceptional and
regional circumstances, impinge upon national political regimes. In fact, as
has been indicated by the ICJ, what is national and international in interna-
tional affairs depends on the state of international relations.7 ' The ICJ has
concluded that terms like "domestic jurisdiction" were not intended to
have a fixed content regardless of the subsequent evolution of international
law.7 In other words, internal and international regimes are intertwined.
A matter, which is seen as a matter of "domestic concern" belonging to a
national regime, might eventually be conceived as a matter of international
concern. Insisting on a rigid dichotomy between the two domains would be
too modern an approach, which "fragilizes" international law.
Indeed, the international system requires a well-functioning state that
can assume and fulfill the obligations of the UN Charter. Indeed, Article
4(1) of the UN Charter states the very same, requiring States "are able to
carry out" their Charter obligations. A State which rests on a solid regime
is seen as the ultimate guarantee for a solid international system. Conse-
quently, international peace and security cannot be abstracted from na-
tional stability, democracy, peace, security, and human rights. Therefore,
the modern case for absolute differentiation between external and internal
affairs is problematic.
"States have never been 'sovereign' in the sense of having the capacity
to be stand-alone governors of every aspect of their societies."7 Sover-
eignty was never really intended to mean total autonomy vis-A-vis the inter-
national community. It "was rather meant to indicate that limits on the
legitimacy of interference by one-state machinery in the operations of an-
other" did exist.76 Sovereignty is a barrier between equals, not a defense
against the international community. In this regard, the R2P does not for-
mally and visibly increase the power of some States vis-A-vis others. The
R2P promotes the "responsibility" of the international community "as a
whole" under the leadership of the SC, not specific individual states as
such; the R2P does not envisage the primacy of some states over others.
The R2P does not, in essence, violate state sovereignty.
The counterargument is that Article 2(7) is clearly worded against UN
intervention in domestic affairs. That is to say, sovereignty is not protected
solely against other states; it is also protected against the international com-
munity as a whole, as represented by the UN. Moreover, "exceptional"
interventions by the UN in domestic human rights violations can occur only
72. "Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order ... the
Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society."
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 148 (1998).
73. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at
9 (Feb. 7).
74. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Dec. 19).
75. PATL HIRST, WAR AND POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 147 (Polity Press 2002).
76. ININIANETEL WALLERSTEIN, HISTORICAL CAPITALISM 57 (Verso 7th ed. 1995).
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when these violations intensify and pose a significant challenge to interna-
tional peace and security. The SC might exceptionally internationalize do-
mestic issues, as were the cases in South Africa,n Southern Rhodesia,
Haiti,"7 Somalia,"o and Libya." But, these are selective and sporadic in-
stances and are not the foundation of a norm of international law. For
instance, the 1998-99 crisis in Sierra Leone presented similar problems to
the one in Haiti in 1994. Both crises involved democratic elections and
cases of violence erupting in the wake of the rejection and non-acknowl-
edgement of democratically elected governments. However, in contrast to
Haiti, no SC resolution was adopted calling for the reinstatement of the
democratically elected government in Sierra Leone. Only after Nigerian-
led ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group) intervention in 1998, did the SC awaken from its passivity, adopt-
ing a resolution and sending peacekeepers to Sierra Leone in 1999.
Another typical example of selectivity is the special international crim-
inal courts established by or in cooperation with the UN in reaction to civil
wars. These courts were established in the aftermath of civil wars in
Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and the former Yugoslavia,
but not for other civil wars. Moreover, these international criminal courts
do not directly intervene in domestic regimes. They demonstrate, at most,
an indirect tendency to effect regime change-their influence and point of
contact are with State officials, not with regimes as such.12 Moreover, in-
ternational criminal liability is not synonymous with the internationaliza-
tion of otherwise internal conflicts for purposes of the law of jus ad belhan.
Similarly, the International Court of Justice's ruling in Nicaragua v.
United States stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty in the context of
the protection of human rights:
77. S.C. Res. 134 U.N. Doc. S/RES/134 (Apr. 1, 1960).
78. S.C. Res. 217, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965). The SC called "upon all States not
to recognize th[e] illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia." S.C. Res. 216, 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/216 (Nov. 12, 1965).
79. S.C. Res. 940 U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); S.C. Res, 933 U.N. Doc. S/RES/933 (June
30, 1994).
80. S.C. Res. 794 U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
81. S.C. Res. 1973 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
82. Passing from individual crime to State crime level and linking the two is a challenge. This
was most visibly encountered in the draft resolution for State responsibility for international wrongs;
the State crime provision was proposed, but later on omitted. The legal personality, and its corollary,
the inviolability of regimes, is a sensitive issue. This is similar to the law on spying activities: only the
prosecution of spies or traitors-individuals-but not States as such before international or national
courts is in question. A national or international court cannot try another State for intelligence activi-
ties, but can try spies of that State. Accordingly:
The State which employs spies or makes use of war treason in its own interest does not violate
international law and is not responsible for these acts. The individual, however, who commits
these acts, may, according to international law, be punished by the injured State. In these
cases, general international law establishes only the individual responsibility of the
perpetrators.
HANs KELSEN, PEACE THROTGH LAw 99-100 (The Univ. of N.C. Press 1944).
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[W]here human rights are protected by international con-
ventions, that protection takes the form of such arrange-
ments for monitoring or ensuring the respect for human
rights as are provided for in the conventions themselves.
In any event ... the use of force could not be the ap-
propriate method to monitor or ensure such respect."
Moreover, the interest of American and European regional human
rights systems in democracy should not be exaggerated. Neither the Inter-
American Court nor the European Court has the power to bring about
structural changes in member States. Member states remain the ultimate
authority in implementing and guaranteeing human rights in their territo-
ries. The courts merely interpret the link between human rights and de-
mocracy and cannot trigger comprehensive changes in states. When
widespread human rights violations take place in a member country, these
systems of human rights conventions do not have any mechanisms for
forceful intervention. The utmost they could require from the violator
states is their withdrawal." By contrast, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive
Act of the African Union specifically mandates the Union to forcefully in-
tervene in a Member State to prevent or stop genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes. 5 However, the African Union has failed to
implement this provision even in deserving situations, such as Darfur and
Libya." There is a gap between this provision and its implementation.
Even the gravest of crimes, genocide, is free of any procedure for
forceful intervention. Genocide is the concern of the international commu-
nity, whether it is of an international or strictly national dimension. How-
ever, there is no mechanism for intervening in a State engaged in genocide.
The 1948 Genocide Convention" provides no method of prevention or
halting of genocide. It has not created a third exception to the prohibition
of the use of force, nor has it amended the UN Charter. Furthermore, the
Convention is merely concerned with individual criminals, regardless of
their status, not the regime as such.
This complex relationship between sovereignty and human rights is
conditioned to a considerable extent by the post-World War II conceptual-
ization of violence.
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
267-68.
84. Tom Kabau, The Responsibility to Protect and the Role of Regional Organizations. an Ap-
praisal of the African Union's Interventions, 4 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT'L L. 49, 51 (2012).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260
(III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948).
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V. VIOLENCE
Post-1945 modernism altered the perception of violence. The "dream
of a non-violent modernity"8 8 overrode other considerations in the post-
war construction of international law. Wars and violence seemed little
more than hindrances and disturbances, which were "comprehensively"
regulated by the UN Charter. Thus the issue of violence was settled. As
such, "there was clearly no need to grant it analytical priority."8 9
However, within the notion of just war, an ambiguity emerged. The
discriminatory concept of war has become difficult to delineate.90 Non-
intervention-outside the two exceptions provided in the Charter-has be-
come the preferred path, whatever the justifications for intervention. How-
ever, not to act is to act as well. That is to say, "not to intervene to alleviate
the sufferings of the world is a form of intervention." The "modern,"
"reified," "legal," and "robust" restriction of violence does not necessarily
signify the restriction of violence on the ground.
International law based itself purportedly on the power of non-vio-
lence. In fact, the distinction between violence and power is a modernist
approach. It implies a connotation between power and stability whereas
violence is perceived as the loss of power. "Power and violence are oppo-
sites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent."9 Violence ap-
pears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own devices, it culminates
in the disappearance of power.93 Violence is seen as the antithesis of the
power of modern international law as embodied by the UN Charter.
The counterargument is that there is a dialectical relationship between
power and violence. Opposites do not destroy but smoothly develop and
merge into each other; contradictions promote rather than paralyze devel-
opment.94 With this approach, violence for the sake of the R2P could be
smoothly integrated into the present international order without any
amendment to the UN Charter. The contradiction between the prohibition
of the use of force and the R2P could find its own natural harmony. The
former is valid on the level of positive international law, the latter in prac-
tice. One does not necessarily and completely eliminate the other; rather
they check, regulate, and restrain each other. Thus, the international com-
munity need not establish an explicit legal procedure for the reconciliation
of the R2P and State sovereignty. The UN Charter represents "formal"
international law and can interact with the "informal" R2P. Indeed, the
2005 World Summit Outcome signaled the compatibility of the two, the
R2P has been linked with the SC. The SC need no more resort to the
88. HANS JOAs & WOLFGANG KNOBL, WAR IN SOCIAL THOTGHT 184 (Alex Skinner trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2013).
89. Id. at 193.
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modern terminology of "unique and exceptional" for interventions in civil
wars.
Though there is still no amendment to the UN Charter incorporating
the R2P, Chapters VI and VII could now be interpreted in the light of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome. The UN Charter is an
international treaty and the application of the World Summit Outcome
might thus constitute "relevant rules of international law" in the sense of
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. To be
sure, the Summit Outcome is not a classic "rule" of international law in the
orthodox sense of the word. It is not binding and not one of the classic
sources of international law as indicated in Article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ. Rather, the Summit Outcome's interpretation of the R2P is a "rule of
interpretation" of the Charter as endorsed by the UN General Assembly-
the most representative of the UN institutions-and is open to further
interpretation.
The recent Brazilian proposal-Responsibility While Protecting
(RWP)-should be seen in this light. As a procedure for implementing the
R2P, the RWP requires giving the international community (the principal)
better access to information about the actions of the SC (the agent) while
acting on behalf of the R2P. It does not change the law on the prohibition
on force, but endeavors to integrate due process into the application of
violence in the name of the R2P. The RWP is conceived as guiding the SC
in its interpretation and implementation of the R2P.9' In this regard, four
points, among others, suggested by the RWP are worth emphasizing:
1. The use of force must produce as little violence and in-
stability as possible and under no circumstance can it
generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent;
2. In the event that the use of force is contemplated, action
must be judicious, proportionate and limited to the
objectives established by the Security Council;
3. Enhanced Security Council procedures are needed to
monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are
interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility
while protecting;
4. The Security Council must ensure the accountability of
those to whom authority is granted to resort to force.
In this regard, the R2P can be seen as a disciplinary project involving
violence and this disciplinary project is open to further interpretation and
improvement. Violent interventions as a consequence of the R2P are
micro-disciplines.9' Micro-disciplines could support the general juridical
95. Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the Permanent Rep. of
Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN. Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701 (Nov.
11, 2011).
96. MICHEL FoLTCALTLT, DISCIPLINE AND PotNISH 222 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books
1977).
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form guaranteeing a system of rights, which are egalitarian in principle 7
the UN Charter is the general juridical form and micro-disciplines consti-
tute nothing more than an infra-law." The R2P does not negate supra-
international law as represented by the UN Charter, which requires the
prohibition of the use of force. Supra-law and infra-law co-exist. And, al-
though the modern universal law of the international society seems to fix
limits on the exercise of violence, on the underside of the supra UN-law, a
machinery-the R2P-that is both immense and minute may undermine
the limits that are traced around the law." This is an example of the anti-
fragile approach. It accepts randomness and uncertainty and the need for
the room for maneuver against harmful stressors-that is, humanitarian
crises. Violence producing humanitarian crises the world over cannot be
eliminated, but the UN system has become anti-fragile vis-A-vis humanita-
rian crises by the adoption of the R2P in the World Summit Outcome-an
infra-law.
With this approach, the survival of the whole system-its an-
tifragility-may require some irregularities at the infra-level.10 0 Formal
UN law as a superstructure could co-exist with the informal R2P, while the
non-violent superstructure of international law in respect to domestic hu-
manitarian crises could tolerate sporadic interventions. The health and sus-
tainability of the overall UN system, in the long term, might rely on these
interventions in the name of the R2P. 101
However, there is a risk that violence for the sake of the implementa-
tion of the R2P could backfire. Micro-discipline in the shape of the R2P
might harm the macro-discipline-that is, the UN system, based on the
non-intervention and the non-use of force, condoning only two exceptions.
Micro-discipline can thus abuse macro-discipline. True, when norms of in-
ternational law are abused, it does not automatically imply that those
norms do not exist, but the effect of those norms begins to be disputed. In
particular, increase in abuses could lead to the questioning of the funda-
mentals of the international system. Hence violent implementation of the
R2P could signal the impotence of the idea of international law as repre-
sented by the UN Charter.
Furthermore, the R2P has a low-specificity output: it is difficult to de-
termine when the R2P is successful, making abuse endemic in the prosecu-
tion of the R2P. Manipulation by powerful states is a distinct possibility,
especially so when the violent prosecution of the R2P does not achieve its
97. Id.
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declared aims as the R2P's ultimate intelligibility, usefulness, and survival
depend on its immediate success. Hannah Arendt put it succinctly when
she talked about the relationship between violence and its purported goals:
Moreover, the danger of violence, even if it moves con-
sciously within a nonextremist framework of short-term
goals, will always be that the means overwhelm the end. If
goals are not achieved rapidly, the result will be not merely
defeat but the introduction of the practice of violence into
the whole body politic. Action is irreversible, and a return
to the status quo in case of defeat is always unlikely. The
practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but
the most probable change is to a more violent world.1 o2
Thus, instead of regarding the R2P as infra-law, narrowing down the
pretense and remit of the R2P and envisaging it simply as a concept and an
instrument of communication would seem a more prudent option. On this
approach, the "R2P talk" sends signals to all states that current interna-
tional law does not meet the demands of the international community. The
international community should use the concept of the R2P to "communi-
cate" the desire to save persecuted peoples in sovereign countries. The
R2P is to be conceived as a guideline to be followed. Whether one agrees
with the language of the R2P or not, it creates a new platform on which
communication is possible and highlights the "responsibility" of the SC.
The R2P is an "argument" for the interest of the international community
in humanitarian crises, an argument, moreover, that is not to be minimized
as mere rhetoric.10 3
True, the language of the R2P is, at the end of the day, the language of
violence. If warnings by the international community to the state con-
cerned do not bear fruition then the use of force would be required by the
R2P. This is still compatible with the contention that communication is
always, to a certain extent, ambiguous and also always an expression of
latent violence.10 Communication is the signal of the implicit violence in
the system and communication on the part of UN law is not an exception.
The UN Charter is the result of the immense violence of the Second World
War, representing the post-1945 reification, and it explicitly provides for
violence in Articles 42 and 51. This, however, does not detract from the
communicative quality of the UN Charter. Likewise, the violence inherent
in the R2P does not eliminate its "communicative" quality.
The communicative quality of the R2P leads us to ask whether the
R2P constitutes a coherent set of ideas and whether it hides new relations
102. ARENDT, supra note 92, at 80.
103. NETA C. CRAWFORD, ARGTMENT AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS: ETHICS, DECOLONIZA-
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of domination or not. In other words, does the communication of the R2P
represent a new ideology?
VI. IDEOLOGY
Ideology refers to the process by which symbolic forms, shorn of the
certainties of traditional societies, are communicated to make the modern
world intelligible.o This intelligibility requires acceptance of relations of
domination. In other words, ideology communicates the ways in which
meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination.o
Does the "communication" of the R2P imply an ideology? Does the
R2P constitute relations of domination through implicitly discriminating
between "civilized" and "uncivilized" nations?10 7 Can the "mature" and
"civilized" international community intervene in "immature" and "uncivi-
lized" nations in the name of the R2P?108 A case in point is NATO's 1999
Kosovo intervention, with some underlining the undisputed democratic and
constitutional character of the participating states.' 09 The democratic and
civilized credentials of interveners would seem to have been valid
justification.
Nevertheless, the world system, since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is
purportedly ideology-neutral. Each state is accepted as a legitimate and
equal subject of the system without reference to ideology.11 o Non-interfer-
ence in domestic affairs and neutrality towards ideologies are the corner-
stones of the current international law, an understanding that has reified.
As mentioned earlier, reification helps "to build and support relations of
domination by making those relations seem eternal, rather than historically
specific, and necessary, rather than contingent.""' Social practices and in-
stitutions become static, natural, and immutable. The UN system is part of
the reification, which started with the Westphalia Peace. The "modern"
reified UN Charter is conceived as ideology-neutral vis-a-vis sovereign
States. However, there are two caveats.
First, the assertion that "there is no ideology of international law" is
itself an ideology. The purportedly ideology-free veil of international law
hides inequalities and relations of domination, the most prominent exam-
ple being the existence of five permanent member states with veto powers
on the SC. The R2P may be a new tool of this "unequal" SC.
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Second, "ideology is at one level self-confirming, but at another level
contains the seeds of its own undoing."" In short, ideological change is
normal,"'which means the ideology of "ideology-lessness" is also subject
to change. The question that therefore arises is, "Has the time arrived to
revise international law's ostensible lack of ideology-impartiality-on the
subject of domestic political regimes?" Can we, in the twenty-first century,
still argue that internationally recognized human rights do not presuppose
a particular national political system? Has the discursive strategy of inter-
national law changed? Is a new international legal ideology, which shapes
state sovereignty through the R2P, in the process of imposing itself on na-
tional ideologies? Or has the UN system reified to such an extent that the
R2P will remain ineffective? Humanitarian intervention has subsisted on
the shadowy periphery of international law"'-will the R2P incur the same
fate?
The modern discursive ideology most often associated with interna-
tional law is universalism. "Universalism is an epistemology ... [t]he es-
sence of this view is that there exist meaningful general statements about
the world-the physical world, the social world-that are universally and
permanently true . . . ."" Sovereignty does not place an obstacle to uni-
versalism. The state is "sovereign" since it is subject only to "universal"
(international) law, not to the national law of any other State. Universal-
ism and state sovereignty are mutually reinforcing. The state's sovereignty
under universal law is merely the state's legal independence from other
states.11 6 Sovereignty in the sense of universal law means the legal author-
ity or competence of a state limited and limitable only by international law,
and not by the national law of another state."'
The question therefore is whether the R2P has matured enough to be-
come a "universal" ideology instead of a pretext employed by some coun-
tries for selective intervention in the domestic affairs of others. Put
differently, the criticism of the application of humanitarian intervention-
and the R2P as its purported replacement-is based on its selectivity. Se-
lectivity has, throughout history, undermined the normative quality of hu-
manitarian intervention. In this respect, has the R2P upgraded
humanitarian intervention-which powerful states have used against weak
states as a pretext-and made it universal? Does, indeed, such a prospect
and possibility exist? Can the R2P rid itself of selectivity?
The plausible answer is that the R2P is a new concept-only twelve
years old-which needs more test cases to prove its sustainability, validity,
and universality. At the moment, it remains a conundrum for theorists.
Only time and challenges ahead will tell whether the R2P will have the
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universal nature it purports to have. The international community's inter-
vention in Libya, which was supported by SC Resolution 1973 referring to
the R2P, increased hopes for the establishment of the R2P. However, the
regime change pushed by interveners has increased the suspicions of major
powers like Russia and China as well as much of the Third World. The
ambiguity and dispute with regard to the current Syrian crisis-the diver-
gence of opinion between the western world on the one hand and Russia
and China on the other-signifies the weakness of the R2P concept. The
R2P is still seen by some sectors of the international community as a con-
tinuation of the "imperialist" and "selective" humanitarian intervention
tradition. It is seen as a new ideology masking the pre-existing relations of
international power struggles and does not constitute a meaningful general
statement about the world. Uncertainty, dishonesty, and selectivity are
seen as linked to the R2P.
Viewed from this perspective, the R2P is the third phase, after World
War II, of intervention by powerful and affluent countries in the domestic
affairs of weaker states.' The first ideology-roughly 1945-70-was
developmentalism, which aimed at bringing technical and expert knowl-
edge to developing countries." 9 However, developmentalism was seen as a
failure, the evaluation being that the Third World was, to its detriment,
under the sway of rich nations rather than international organizations.120
This lack of satisfaction in the developing world was expressed in the GA
declarations on "the new international economic order"1 2' and "the full
and permanent sovereignty over natural resources."1 2 The second ideol-
ogy was neoliberalism (1970-2008), with the rich democracies of the north
positing the crucial importance of liberalization of world trade, consumer
participation in the global market, and the protection of individual rights
against the state. These arguments were advanced against the demands for
equality by the South. Neoliberalism sidelined the United Nations and
promoted the World Bank and the IMF instead-two institutions con-
trolled by the West.1 21 After the 2008 World Economic Crisis, the ideology
of neoliberalism has come under increasing fire. In this connection, does
the R2P (2001-Present) represent the third phase of intervention in the
domestic affairs of weak countries? Will the R2P be used as an ideology
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justifying a certain hierarchy among countries? Will it be used as a pretext
for intervention?
For the moment, only speculative answers can be provided which is
why an anti-fragile perspective on the R2P is necessary. The R2P should
be conceptualized in such a way that it absorbs the volatility of humanita-
rian crises worldwide. A case-by-case approach should be adopted as rec-
ommended by paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome. Policy
recommendations such as the RWP should, as much as possible, be incor-
porated into the functioning of the R2P. In the process, a coherent and
automatic reaction to every humanitarian crisis is not to be expected. The
international community should regard each humanitarian crisis as a new
opportunity to improve the R2P. The fact that the R2P has not been legal-
ized as an international treaty, custom, or a general principle of law should
be of little concern. The R2P can only be feasible if it is understood as an
anti-fragile response-a non-linear response-to humanitarian crises, and
not as a mechanistically predetermined reaction. The R2P is a process, not
a norm.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modern UN law does not answer the calls for the prevention and halt-
ing of humanitarian crises. The concept of R2P is an important step in
acknowledging this problem. It reconceptualizes violence on the interna-
tional stage and attempts to establish a new balance between sovereignty
and human rights. Nevertheless, it is a moot point as to whether the R2P
represents a new ideology hiding new relations of domination in interna-
tional politics or not.
The success of the R2P does not depend on its legalization, but its
successful communication and implementation by the SC. Only an anti-
fragile and informal R2P, which would acknowledge the uncertainty and
volatility inherent in humanitarian crises, and which would not insist on
complete consistency in reacting to them, would survive the complexity of
international politics.
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